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This paper argues that traditional explanations of the fiscal crisis in transition 
economies overlook the crucial interconnection between the reduction in subsidies 
expenditure and the decrease in profit tax revenues.  It thus contends that the impact on 
the fiscal  budget of the crisis of state-owned enterprises profitability has been largely 
overestimated in the literature.  The net contribution to the government budget from the 
enterprise sector - defined as profit taxes net of cross-subsidization - has increased during 
the transition in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and has remained constant in Hungary. 
After reexamining the data, it is argued that  - while it is undoubtable that the prospects 
for fiscal revenues are worrisome - the main  determinant of the fiscal crisis is to the 
explosion of social security expenditures.  The paper also assesses the applicability of 
these results to other former socialist economies. 
 
Keywords:   Poland; Hungary; Czechoslovakia; Eastern Europe; Socialist  
      economies; economic transition; fiscal crisis; revenue crisis;  
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
A stylized fact for virtually all reforming ex-socialist economies (RESEs) is the 
deep fiscal crisis experienced after the onset of the liberalization programs (see Table 1).  
To a certain extent the emergence of a fiscal crisis should not be surprising, since almost 
all the reforming economies also experienced, at least during 1990-91, considerable 
output losses, of a magnitude not previously seen in market economies.  Inasmuch as 
automatic stabilizers were built into the structure of the socialist public sector (at least on 
the revenue side), one should have expected that the recession would be accompanied by 
a large swing in fiscal balances.  But, as several authors have pointed out, there are more 
serious, structural reasons underlying the crisis, which require the policy-makers' 
attention (see Tanzi 1991 and 1993b).  The following factors are commonly cited. 
  
Table 1. Selected Economies in Transition: General Government Balance 
(percentage of GDP) 
  1989   1990   1991   1992   1993  
       
Albania  -8.6   -15.4   -30.6   -22.6   -16.0  
Bulgaria  ..    -8.5   -4.1   -5.0   -9.2  
former Czechoslovakia 1/  -2.4   0.1   -2.0   -3.6   -0.3  
Hungary  -1.3   0.5   -2.5   -8.0   -6.0  
Poland  -5.8   3.2   -6.5   -6.7   -2.4  
Ukraine 2/  -     -     -13.6   -27.8   -16.3  
Russian Republic 2/ 3/  -3.1   -6.3   -16.0   -6.9   -5.7  
Belarus 2/  -     -     3.7   -6.4   -8.4  
Sources: Ministries of Finance; World Bank and IMF estimates. 
              
1/ The figure for 1993 is the GDP-weighted average of fiscal deficits of Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.  
2/ Data on general government accounts in former Soviet Union countries are highly controversial, 
and need to be taken with extreme caution. See for example Le Houerou et al. (1994). 
3/ Figures prior to 1991 refer to the USSR. 
 
 
On the revenue side, the traditional tax base of RESEs was the state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) sector.  The sector has borne the main brunt of the recession, driving 
down tax collection, and is likely to further lose relative importance in the economy, as 
privatization advances and industry is downsized.  The lost traditional tax base cannot 
easily be replaced by increasing contributions from other sectors, since either these are 
traditionally difficult to tax (some services, small businesses), or the administration is not 
prepared to implement the new tax laws that are approved by the legislature. L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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On the expenditure side, despite the relief provided by sharp cuts in government 
subsidies, the central government is burdened with many of the social costs of 
adjustment, previously hidden within the SOE system.  These include, in addition to 
unemployment benefits likely to be high for a number of years, the cost of supporting, 
either through the pension system or the social assistance system, the people displaced 
from the work-force by the transformation.  In addition, the switch to positive real 
interest rate policies, together with the emergence of large deficits and non-bank 
financing of the budget, has led to increasing debt-service pressures. 
This paper argues, however, that a crucial interconnection between reduction in 
subsidy expenditures and decrease in profit tax revenues has been overlooked, and that, 
at least for a number of Central European countries for which relatively good data is 
available, overall revenues have shown a remarkable resilience.  The fiscal crisis, where 
it has occurred, appears to have largely been an expenditure phenomenon. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, after reviewing the 
implications of transition on the fiscal budget, we discuss a simple two-sectors model of 
profit tax revenues and subsidy expenditure in a transition economy. In the third section, 
we present evidence from Poland, Hungary and former Czechoslovakia.  In section four 
we focus on some elements of the increase of social spending, and provide some selected 
evidence on the topic.  In the fifth section, we assess how far our findings can be 
generalized to other transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
II.   PROFIT TAX REVENUES AND SUBSIDY EXPENDITURES 
IN   A TRANSITION ECONOMY 
  The fiscal crisis associated to the early stages of economic transformation is no 
longer a matter of dispute
1. On the expenditure side, the transition to market brings deep 
cuts in producer and consumer subsidies, as well as a dramatic surge in transfers to 
households.  The cut in subsidies is a crucial part of any liberalization package. The rapid 
expansion of the social security system - in all its components: unemployment benefits, 
social insurance, social assistance - is also directly related to the economic transformation 
process.  Four years of reforms, however, suggest that earlier expectations about the 
evolution of social expenditures failed to size appropriately the magnitude of the problem.  
In particular, as we discuss below, the expected surge in recession-related benefits has been 
more than overwhelmed by the use that has been made of the pension system as an 
absorber of surplus labor previously hidden in the SOEs. Furthermore, the switch to a 
                                                 
1   A comparative analysis of the functions of public finance in market and planned economies can be found 
in Barbone and Marchetti (1994).  There, and in a textbook fashion in Tanzi (1992 and 1993a), one can also find a 
discussion of the effects of transition on the fiscal budget. Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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market economy brings about increased expenditure related to the need to make quasi-
fiscal deficits previously hidden in the banking sector an explicit budget item
2. 
  On the revenue side, most observers agree that a sizeable decrease in tax revenues 
could be expected to accompany economic transformation of socialist countries (see, for 
example, Tanzi, 1991, and Stiehler, 1993), due to several factors.  A tax administration 
must be built almost from scratch, to be able to cope with the complex tax collection 
problems which arise in a market economy.  Achieving the administrative capability of 
successfully implementing the new legislation, and properly taxing the private enterprises, 
will take time. Meanwhile, a large part of the income produced in the newly emerging 
activities will be taxed to only a limited extent, if any.  The most important factor stressed 
by almost all studies of fiscal aspects of transition, however, is the decline of profitability in 
the public enterprise sector during transition, and the corresponding decline in profit tax 
payments (see, for example, Stiehler, 1993). Several explanations for the fall of profits are 
documented in the literature
3. In general, there is a wide consensus that, although some 
success cases do exist (see Pinto et al., 1992, on Polish SOEs), the overall performance of 
the public enterprise sector has considerably worsened during transition. 
  But in a socialist system, SOEs profits tell only one side of the story of enterprises 
performance. SOE performance - and profitability - are in fact closely interconnected with 
cross-subsidization, a fact which needs to be given due consideration in the analysis. 
However, although the cut in subsidies during transition has been widely acknowledged in 
the literature, its consequences on the SOEs profitability - and, therefore, profit tax 
payments  - have been surprisingly disregarded. 
  In a planned economy profit tax revenues and subsidy expenditures are linked to 
each other through relative prices, which are administratively set by the planner.  Through 
the pursuit of some of his objectives -- inexpensive food for the population, or cheap raw 
materials for strategic industries -- the central planner favors some industries at the expense 
of others:  relative prices are chosen that penalize the latter and artificially promote the 
financial performance of the former.  The fiscal outcome is a combination of inflated profit 
tax revenues from "good" enterprises, and equally inflated subsidy expenditures to cover 
the losses of the less fortunate enterprises. After price liberalization and the adjustment of 
relative prices, gross profits will be smaller, but so will gross losses. From the fiscal point 
of view, profit tax revenues decrease, but so do subsidy expenditures. Whether the net flow 
from enterprises to the government budget decreases or increases depends on a number of 
factors. However, economic logic would suggest that, in general, moving from a situation 
                                                 
2 This point has been stressed by many, particularly inasmuch as it implies that, at the early stages of the 
economic transformation, targeting the fiscal deficit may not be very meaningful (Bruno, 1992, and Tanzi, 1993; 
see also Schwartz et al., forthcoming). 
3 The single most important factor is the recession that accompanied the reforms (see Ko_odko, 1993, for a 
taxonomy of post-reform fiscal stages).  Other common explanations of the fall of SOEs profitability include the 
disappearance of windfall profits due to hyperinflation and historical costs accounting, higher costs of energy and 
other imported production goods,and management's inability to deal with the new system (see, for example 
Schaffer, 1992, Schwartz et al., forthcoming, and Bruno, 1992). L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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with highly distorted relative prices (and resource allocation) to one with market-
determined relative prices, the net fiscal position of enterprises should improve, for at least 
two reasons. The first is that resources are used more efficiently in the economy (and 
therefore profits net of losses should be higher, and yield more profit tax revenues). The 
second is that the budget receives only a fraction of enterprise profits, whereas it usually 
ends up covering the whole amount of losses. 
 A simple two-sector model can be useful to capture, within a basic analytical 
framework, the above features of public finance in a transition economy. 
  The transition economy of our model has two sectors, which produce, respectively, 
good x and y. We can think of x as a consumer good, and y as a good which can be both 
consumed and used as intermediate input for producing x. 
 Two enterprises, one in each sector, produce all the goods in the economy. We 
pursue a short term analysis, and can therefore quite reasonably assume that capital is fixed 
in both sectors, the intermediate good y is used to produce x in fixed proportions, and 
substitutability between labor and the intermediate input is limited. While these 
assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity, they do not affect the substance of our 
results. We therefore have the following short-term production functions: 
x = min [ Alx
α , yx ] = min [ Alx
α ,axyx]        ( 1 )  
and  
y = Bly
β ,           ( 2 )  
where  lx and ly are, respectively, the amount of labor used to produce x and y, yx is 
the amount of good y used to produce good x, and axy is the (fixed) number of units of y 
needed to produce one unit of x. 
 Taxable operating margins (which include here both return to capital and "pure" 
profits, if any) can be defined in each sector as: 
πx = x - wlx - paxyx          ( 3 )  
and 
πy = py - wly  ,            ( 4 )  
where p is the price of y, and w is the wage rate, both expressed in terms of x. 
 We assume that the level of production, as well as the real wage w, are set 
exogenously by the central planner.  Profits in both sectors are therefore function of the 
relative price p, and their schedule is shown in the left-side diagram in Figure 1 below.  
Simple algebra reveals that πy is an increasing function of p, and πx is inversely correlated 
(for details, see the Appendix). 
  Enterprises pay taxes on their operating margins, if they are positive. If they are 
negative (losses), they receive subsidies from the government for the whole amount. Total 
profit tax revenues T and subsidy expenditures S are therefore defined as follows: Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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T = τ [max (πx,0) + max (πy,0) ]         ( 5 )  
and 
S = - [min (πx,0) + min (πx,0)],        (6) 
where τ is the tax rate, and 0 < τ < 1. 
  Total profit tax revenues T and subsidy outlays S can be also expressed as function 
of the relative price p, given x, y and w. Their schedule is shown in the left-hand side of 
Figure 1. 
  As illustrated by the diagram, there is a price range (p1, p2) in which both industries 
have positive operating margins.  This price range will include the market-determined 
relative price, if the given levels of x and y can be supported as competitive equilibrium 
quantities by some price vector. Within this range there is a positive net flow from each 
enterprise to the government budget: profit taxes are paid, no subsidies are required.  
 
  As the central planner moves the relative price away from the "market equilibrium", 
the profitability in the two industries will be affected in opposite directions.  One industry 
will enjoy larger profits, while the other will begin to incur losses. The fiscal implications, 
which we want to highlight in this paper, are as follows.  As prices become more distorted, 
one of the two industries will record negative operating margins and will require subsidies 
from the government.  For a given price range (i.e. p3 > p > p2 or p1 > p > p0) the subsidies 
paid by the government to the loss-making industry are lower than profit tax revenues from 
the other industry: the net flow from the enterprise sector remains positive, albeit shrinking. 
 However, as relative prices become more distorted - i.e., p is either greater than p3 or lower 
than p0 - subsidy outlays cannot be covered by profit tax revenues, and there is a negative L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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flow from the enterprise sector to the budget.  Notice, however, that although the net flow 
to the government may become negative, gross flows will keep increasing. 
 What are the implications of this simple model for the fiscal accounts in the 
transition? To the extent that liberalization brings the relative price vector towards the 
market-determined equilibrium within the (p1, p2) range, two opposite phenomena will be 
observed:  overall gross profitability will decline, bringing about lower profit tax revenues. 
 But subsidies also will decline.  The change in the net position of the enterprise sector vis-a 
-vis the government will be the result of the combination of these two factors.  In this 
simple model, the presumption is that the government will always benefit from the 
transition.  In reality, naturally, one would need to temper the results of the model with the 
probable fall in output (as discussed) and the changes in real wages that are likely to 
accompany the price liberalization.  Nevertheless, the elimination of the "duplication 
effect" just described may be sufficiently important as to produce a distorted picture of the 
evolution of the fiscal accounts.   In the next section we will see that, based on data from 
the three countries considered here (and indeed from other transition economies as well, see 
section five) this appears to be indeed the case. 
III.   A TRADITIONAL AND AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE 
  FISCAL CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM POLAND, HUNGARY 
 AND  CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 
  How important is the disappearance of the "duplication effect" just discussed in 
explaining the emergence of the fiscal crisis in Central Europe?  In this section, we offer 
evidence from Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia.  We first present general 
government data according to the traditional classification used in the study of the fiscal 
crisis in transition economies. This presentation naturally leads to emphasize the strong 
decline in fiscal revenues as the main culprit for the fiscal crisis.  In a nutshell, deep 
expenditure cuts, particularly on the subsidy side, have been insufficient to counteract the 
ruinous decline in income tax payments from enterprises (mainly SOEs).  
 We then provide a somewhat different presentation of the same data, aimed at 
capturing the essence of the discussion in the preceding section: the profit tax decline 
observed during the transition is ephemeral.  In order to show this, as explained above, we 
adopt the concept of net contribution of the SOE sector to the budget, defined as profit 
taxes net of producer subsidies.  The periods considered are 1986-88 (or 1985-87 for 
Poland) and 1991-92, chosen to be as representative as possible, for each country, of the 
fiscal performance under the two distinct regimes
4. 
                                                 
4 In Poland, for example, the data for 1989 and 1990 are highly distorted by two phenomena that make their 
interpretation hopeless:  the hyperinflation of 1989 and the subsequent increase in paper profits in enterprises in 
1990 (see Barbone, 1992 and Schaffer, 1992; see also Gomulka, 1994). However, the substance of our results is not 
altered by considering different periods. Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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III.1.  The Traditional View of the Fiscal Crisis 
Although the direct and indirect budgetary consequences of transition are numerous 
and complex, the heart of the matter, according to the "traditional" view, seems to be as 
follows  (see table 3.1).   
  The general government balance deteriorated considerably between the two periods 
considered in both Poland and Hungary, and only modestly in Czechoslovakia.   This 
deterioration is the result of similar trends in revenues and expenditures.  During the period 
under consideration, government revenues decreased considerably in all countries, by as 
much as 8-12 percent of GDP.  The main cause of this drastic fall seems to be the collapse 
of  tax revenues from public enterprises.  Tax collection from both private enterprises and 
individuals increased, but far less than necessary to offset the former impact. 
  On the expenditure side, the increase in transfers to households - by 5-11 percent of 
GDP - was more than offset by the cut of subsidies - by 11-19 percent of GDP - so that 
overall total government expenditures decreased - by 4-11 percent of GDP.  However, the 
reduction of government revenues was too large to be offset by the decrease in government 
expenditure, particularly in Poland and Hungary. Hence the emergence of the fiscal crisis.  
This can be considered the heart of the "traditional" approach to fiscal crisis during 
transition in Poland and Hungary. 
 
Table 3.1. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia: Evolution of Deficit , 1986-1992. 
(percent of GDP, average over specified years) 
 Poland  Hungary  Czechoslovakia 
  1985-87 1991-92  Change  1986-88 1991-92 Change 1986-88 1991-92 Change 
General Govt. Balance  -0.4   -5.4   -5.0   -2.2   -5.3   -3.0   -1.7   -2.8   -1.1  
Revenues  48.2   41.3   -6.9   61.3   53.3   -8.0   64.6   52.8   -11.9  
  Profit taxes  11.1   5.8   -5.3   10.5   4.0   -6.5   18.6   12.7   -5.8  
  Turnover Taxes 1/  11.5   7.2   -3.3   17.3   13.4   -4.0   15.8   12.7   -3.1  
Expenditures  48.5   46.6   -1.9   63.5   58.6   -5.0   66.4   55.6   -10.8  
  Transfers to H'holds  9.9   19.7   9.9   13.7   24.4   10.7   11.8   16.3   4.4  
  Subsidies  16.2   5.0   -11.2   15.6   5.6   -9.9   26.3   7.9   -18.5  
  Interest  0.9   2.2   1.3   1.8   3.9   2.1   0.0   0.8   0.8  
  Capital Expenditures  5.3   3.0   -2.3   8.0   6.3   -1.7   2.0   4.9   2.9  
Sources: Ministries of Finance; World Bank staff estimates. 
1/ In Hungary it includes VAT. 
 
  In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the decrease in government expenditure was 
larger than in Poland and Hungary, and it almost matched the decrease of government 
revenues. This was mainly due to the lower increase in transfers to households. Such 
transfers account for a large fraction of government spending in all countries, and they 
almost doubled in size - relatively to GDP - in Poland and Hungary, while they rose by less L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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than 40 percent in Czechoslovakia. We will return to this issue, which, as we argue, is the 
single most important factor behind the fiscal crisis in transition economies. 
III.2.  An Alternative View of the Fiscal Crisis. 
The traditional view of the fiscal crisis cannot be faulted for attributing a large share 
of responsibility to the SOE performance. On the face of it, profit tax revenues collapsed in 
Poland from 11 percent of GDP in 1986 to 4.5 percent in 1992, in Hungary from 11 percent 
of GDP to 2 percent, and in Czechoslovakia from 18 percent to 12 percent (figures are 
rounded to unity; the data on the consolidated fiscal accounts of the three countries are 
available from the authors on request)
5. 
 The raw figures, impressive as they are, should be reinterpreted according to 
indications provided by the simple model discussed above, that argues that the fall in 
profitability is in itself largely attributable to the fall in subsidies.  The reduction in 
subsidies in the three countries has indeed been dramatic. They decreased in Poland from 
about 16 percent of GDP in 1986 to 3.6 percent of GDP in 1992, in Hungary from 17 
percent of GDP to 4 percent, and in the former Czechoslovakia from 25 percent to 7 
percent. Even more strikingly, virtually all the cuts took place in only three years in Poland 
(1989-1991) and two years in Czechoslovakia (1990-1991), showing the early 
determination of these governments to get rid of the old economic system. The process in 
Hungary has been somewhat more gradual, with the cuts spread evenly over 1987-1992. 
The distribution of the few remaining subsidies varies across countries
6. 
 In order to capture the essence of the simple model presented in section II, we 
reclassify fiscal data as follows. We obtain "net profit taxes" by subtracting producer 
subsidies from profit tax revenues. Analogously, we obtain net total revenues and net total 
expenditures - i.e., net of cross-subsidization.  Table 3.2 presents the resulting 
decomposition of the change in the general government deficit. 
 The deterioration in the general government balance during the period is thus 
unchanged: 5 percentage points of GDP in Poland and 3 percentage points in Hungary.  
However, this deterioration can now be evenly decomposed into a decrease in net revenues 
(which fell between 0.4 and 3.1 percent of GDP) and an increase in net expenditures for 
Poland and Hungary (4.5 and 1.4 percent of GDP, respectively). The former 
                                                 
5 Data on profit tax and turnover tax refer to, respectively, Enterprise Income Tax and VAT, for the 
countries/years in which they have been replaced by the latter. 
6 These are mainly consumer subsidies in Poland (including subsidies on housing), and producer subsidies in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A major category of consumer subsidies in all three countries - almost entirely 
eliminated by the reforms - used to be on food products.  Major categories within producer subsidies included 
subsidies on energy and intermediate goods. Of course, the subsidies shown in the fiscal budget are not the only 
ones in the economy. "Cheap" loans, specific contracts between enterprises and the government and some 
government regulations can all - under certain circumstances - be considered implicit subsidies. This is one of the 
arguments used to criticize the fiscal deficit as a measure of macroeconomic efficiency (see Tanzi, 1993b, and 
Schwartz et al., forthcoming). Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, also sees a decrease in net expenditures, resulting in a 
worsening of the fiscal deficit of only one percentage point of GDP. 
 
Table 3.2. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia: Evolution of Deficit - An Alternative Decomposition,             
          1986-1992.                                 (percentage of GDP, average over specified periods) 
 Poland  Hungary  Czechoslovakia 
  1985-87 1991-92 Change 1986-88 1991-92 Change 1986-88 1991-92  Change 
General Govt. Balance  -0.4   -5.5   -5.0   -2.2   -5.3   -3.0   -1.7   -2.8   -1.1  
Net Revenues  41.1   40.6   -0.5   51.6   50.0   -1.6   49.5   46.4   -3.1  
  Net profit taxes  4.0   5.1   1.1   0.7   0.7   0.0   3.5   6.4   2.9  
  Turnover Taxes  11.5   8.2   -3.3   17.3   13.4   -4.0   15.8   12.7   -3.1  
Net Expenditures  41.5   45.9   4.5   53.8   55.2   1.4   51.3   49.2   -2.1  
  Transfers to  H'holds  9.9   19.7   9.9   13.7   24.4   10.7   11.8   16.3   4.4  
  Consumer Subsidies  9.1   2.9   -6.3   5.8   2.3   -3.5   4.1   0.0   -4.1  
  Interest Payments  0.9   2.2   1.3   1.8   3.9   2.1   0.0   0.8   0.8  
  Capital Expenditures  5.3   3.0   -2.3   8.0   6.3   -1.7   2.0   4.9   2.9  
Sources: Ministries of Finance; authors' estimates. 
 
  It is worth stressing that the decline in net revenues common to the three countries is 
due to altogether different reasons than the ones seen in table 3.1.  The most important fact 
emphasized by table 3.2 is in fact that the net contribution of the enterprise sector to the 
fiscal budget has increased during transition, by 1.1 percent of GDP in Poland and by 
almost 3 percent in Czechoslovakia and has remained unchanged in Hungary.  Despite the 
shrinkage in the tax base due to the recession, therefore, the transition process - with price 
and other liberalization measures - appears to have benefitted general government 
revenues, at least in their direct relation with the enterprise sector. 
    The main factor underlying the decline in revenues (after accounting for the 
disappearance of the duplication effect), was - in all countries - the decline of turnover 
taxes, which fell by 3-5 percent of GDP.  In Poland, such decrease is partially due to the 
fact that the prices of the goods which account for most of the tax revenue - spirits, 
petroleum product and tobacco - have not kept pace with the inflation rate, particularly in 
1989 and 1990.  Collectability issues also played a role, as delays in the payment of the tax 
increased sharply in those same years
7. 
  The reclassification of the data in table 3.2 has also the advantage of pointing out the 
explosive behavior of social security expenditure, which is overshadowed in more 
traditional approaches by the deep cut of subsidies. Indeed, government expenditure other 
than producer subsidies has increased significantly in Poland and Hungary, mostly on 
                                                 
7 See Bolkowiak (1993). In 1989, for example, collection orders ceased to be applied to tax charges, 
weakening the enforcement of tax collection. L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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transfers to the population
8. Such increase seems to have gone beyond the government's 
intent of offsetting the negative distributive effects of the cut in subsidies (see next section). 
It is in this sense that we suggest that, although the future performance of fiscal revenues is 
a matter of serious concern, the fiscal crisis in central Europe has been so far more an 
expenditure, than a revenue phenomenon. 
IV.    ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL SPENDING CRISIS 
  This section reviews some elements of the increase of social security expenditure in 
the three countries. Rather than attempting a comprehensive analysis of the topic, we 
provide some selected pieces of evidence, which we believe can help to capture some of the 
main factors at play. 
 Social security outlays provide the bulk of general government expenditures in 
transition economies.  In 1992, they accounted for almost half of total expenditures in 
Poland and Hungary, and for about 30 percent in Czechoslovakia.  They increased as share 
of GDP from 1986-88 to 1991-92 by about 80 percent in Hungary and 90 percent in 
Poland, but by less than 40 percent in Czechoslovakia.  In 1986, the share of GDP spent on 
social security in Czechoslovakia was higher than in Poland, and very close to that in 
Hungary.  In 1992, the same figure in Czechoslovakia was by several percentage points 
lower than the corresponding ones in both Poland and Hungary. 
 
Table 4.1. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia: Recipients of Pensions                           
           (Thousands), 1987-93. 
  1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993 
Poland    6,477 6,669 6,827 7,104 7,944 8,495 8,730 
  (growth rate)   2.8   3.0  2.4  4.1  11.8  6.9   2.8 
Hungary  2,374 2,422 2,477 2,556 2,680 2,797 2,870 
  (growth rate)  1.6   2.3  2.0  3.1  4.9  4.4   2.6 
Czechoslovakia 1/  4,057  4,066 4,149 4,210 4,297 4,317  .. 
   (growth rate)  0.9   0.2  2.0  1.5  2.1  0.5   2.1 
Sources: Biuletyn Statystyczny and Rocznik Statystyczny, several issues; Statisticka 
Rocenka 1989, 1990 and 1992, and Czech Republic Bureau of Statistics; Statistical 
Yearbook of Hungary, 1993. 
1/ The growth rate for 1993 is for Czech pensioners only.  
 
 
                                                 
8 In fact, one could define the "net contribution" of the household sector in fashion similar to that defined for 
the SOE sector.  Although there are some methodological problems (since the introduction of the personal income 
tax makes pre- and post-liberalization comparisons difficult), the data would show an increase in net payments to 
the household sector even when the effect of the reduction of direct subsidies to households is taken into account. Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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 To some extent, the increase in social security spending was a necessary 
consequence of transition, as the reaction to new conditions of a labor force whose 
employment rate was unusually high for western standards
9. However, the data for Poland 
and Hungary - particularly if compared to Czechoslovakia - suggest that the system has 
been stretched somewhat beyond its institutional functions, in order to absorb some of the 
social distress brought by the transition.  The main data are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. 
  In Hungary, the annual growth rate of the number of pensioners in 1991 and 1992 
was respectively twice and three times higher than in 1987-88. 
 Even more revealing are the figures for Poland. In this country, the number of 
pensioners increased by almost 28 percent in the period 1990-93, whereas annual growth 
rates had ranged between 2 and 3 percent in previous years. Some disaggregated data are 
also quite impressive. For example, the number of old age non-farmers pensioners 
increased by 18 percent in 1991, after increasing by average by only 1 percent per year in 
the period 1986-1990. Although the extended use of retirement and disability pensions 
reached its peak in the aftermath of the reforms (1990-91), it still continued to a significant 
extent in 1992. 
  These developments are closely interconnected with the massive process of labor 
force reallocation and reduction that has taken place in Poland after 1989.  Between 1989-
92, employment in state-owned enterprises decreased by as much as 40 percent, and 
employment in the public sector -SOEs and general government - by almost 30 percent. 
Overall, employment in Poland fell by 12 percent in the period 1989-92.  In response to 
that, unemployment benefits - which did not exist in 1986 - increased to almost 2 percent of 
GDP in 1992.  However, given the size of the phenomenon, the burden of absorbing the 
reduction in employment spilled over to the rest of the social security system.  
  This spill-over was made possible by a combination of liberal legislation and loose 
application of the existing rules.  The main factors - common to other transition economies 
- include generous eligibility conditions for early retirement and disability pensions, and 
high replacement ratios.  As argued by Maret and Schwartz (1992), the social insurance 
system seems to have played a role, at least to some extent, that should have been assigned 
to social assistance programs and other proper safety net provisions.  
 The picture is rather different in the former Czechoslovakia. Formal employment 
there decreased by about 12 percent during 1989-92, a figure comparable to Poland.   
However, the unemployment rate remained much smaller, at 6.6 percent in 1991 and 5 
percent in 1992 (it was 13.6 percent in 1992 in Poland).  This would suggest that the 
pressure on the social security system might also have been very high;  nevertheless, the 
outcome in terms of number of new pensions was very different than the one just seen for 
Poland.   While the growth rate of disability pensions - which had been stable in previous 
years - more than doubled in 1990 and increased by another 60 percent in 1991, the overall 
                                                 
9 We thank one referee for pointing this out to us. L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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numbers remained considerably below Poland and Hungary - in the former, for example, 
the annual growth rate of total non-farmers pensions increased in 1991, one year after the 
reform, by more than 400 percent, compared with the average annual growth rate in 1986-
90.  On the whole, inflows into the pension system in Czechoslovakia after 1990 diverged 
very little from the long-term trends that had prevailed until then. 
 The different outcome is probably explained by differences in the social security 
legislation across the countries, as well as the administrative application of the existing 
rules. A detailed analysis of such differences is outside the scope of this paper, although the 
relevance of such study is enhanced by our results. 
 
Table 4.2. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia: Real Average Pension, 1986-92. 
  1986   1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992  
Poland  95.8    100.0 101.4 105.6  92.3 103.1    94.4
Hungary   99.5   100.0  100.7  101.4  98.8  91.4   82.4
Czechoslovakia  1/  2/  .. 100.0 104.2 117.6 107.5  80.0    71.2
Source: Biuletyn Statystyczny and Rocznik Statystyczny, several issues; Statisticka Rocenka 
1989, 90 and 1992, and Czech Republic Bureau of Statistics; Statistical Yearbook of 
Hungary, 1992. 
1/ Data refer to old age pensions only. 
2/ Czech Republic only (which, however, accounted for about three fourths of CSFR 
pensions). 
 
  A final remark is the following.  The moderate increase in social spending in the 
former Czechoslovakia seems to have been achieved - to some extent - also through 
important cuts in pensioners' living standards.  The real average pension decreased by 25 
percent in 1991, and by a further 11 percent in 1992 (see table 4.2). They have somewhat 
recovered more recently. Pensioners in Hungary have also experienced a 20 percent 
cumulative cut in real terms in their allowances, in the whole period. Polish pensioners 
seem instead to have been better shielded from inflation throughout the transition process: 
the average real pension in 1992 was roughly at 1986 levels. 
V.   EVIDENCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
  How much can our interpretation of the evolution of the fiscal accounts in central 
eastern Europe be generalized to other former socialist economies?  Data limitations here 
prevent a thorough analysis beyond what was shown in the previous sections, with perhaps 
the only exception of Bulgaria.  For this country, the findings of a recent study by Bogetic 
and Hillman (1994) confirm, to a surprising extent, the validity of our results. Indeed, there 
is evidence that the net flow from the enterprise sector to the budget in Bulgaria has 
increased substantially after the beginning of market reforms in February 1991. In all other 
former socialist economies the budgetary accounting practices followed until recently, 
designed to meet the needs of central planning and to minimize the amount of information Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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revealed publicly, make it virtually impossible to reconstruct consolidated accounts prior to 
1992. The radical change of accounting standards in Romania in that year, and the resulting 
break of consistency with previous years accounts, is a clear example. Le Houerou et al. 
(1994) effort to reconstruct the 1992 fiscal accounts of the Russian Republic has found that, 
after including off-budget government transactions,  consolidated government spending 
amounted to more than twice the official budget expenditures. It is clear that no meaningful 
analytical work can be carried out using this kind of official data, and that any serious 
investigation should be preceded by a process of data reconstruction, which may not even 
be feasible.  In addition, the more liberal use of the banking system as quasi-fiscal provider 
of financing, as well as the lack of autonomous investment decisions by enterprises, make it 
even more difficult to disentangle the web of relations between the budget and the 
enterprise sector in the other countries. 
  However, even in the absence of hard figures, we can suggest three variants on the 
description of public finance evolution seen above. As we see below, the analysis carried 
out in this paper turns out to be quite relevant, although in a different way, for a number of 
transition economies.  
 The first variant is that of a central-european-like behavior, that appears to have 
taken place in the case of Romania and, especially, Bulgaria.  Here, the net contribution of 
the enterprise sector to the budget seems to have roughly remained constant or increased 
after reforms, while rapid increases in social expenditures contributed to a marked 
deterioration in public finances. 
  The second variant is that of Albania. Its case is rather unique, and the scope for 
applying our analysis is therefore limited.  Albania is one of the few formerly socialist 
countries where the process of de-industrialization has proceeded so far as to fundamentally 
change the composition of output, and, as a consequence, to lead to a strong deterioration 
of public revenues beyond the disappearance of the duplication effect discussed above.  
The share of industry (which was entirely state-owned) in GDP has declined from over 40 
percent in the late 1980s to 12 percent in 1993, the largest decline observed in reforming 
socialist economies.   The reasons for this decline have been discussed elsewhere (see 
World Bank, 1994).  Suffice it to say that the opening of the country made its industry, 
technologically obsolete by at least fifty years, non-viable overnight.  Profit taxes have 
virtually disappeared.  At the same time, the increase in social spending has also 
materialized, leading to a fiscal crisis of unprecedented dimension, which can only be 
sustained because of the large inflows of concessionary financing that the country 
continues to enjoy.  In the medium-term, given in particular the sorry state of its tax 
administration, Albania is probably the former socialist country with the worst fiscal 
problem. 
  The last variant is the one that seems to be offered by Russia and some other of its 
former provinces (most notably the Ukraine, Belarus, and some of the Asian states).  In 
these countries  - although the situation is in a rapid state of flux - one could argue that the 
lack of decisive pursuit of economic reform has led to a fiscal crisis despite the lack of 
massive shifts out of the labor force, and the resulting lack of increase of social L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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expenditure.  The continued subsidies to industry may have led to an initially lower 
emergence of open unemployment and to the lack of the massive shift into the pensioners' 
ranks observed elsewhere, but at the cost of delaying the emergence of the supply response 
that seems to have now take firmly hold in the central eastern European economies.   
Interestingly, available evidence suggest that in these countries the insufficient progress in 
the structural adjustment and resource reallocation process is typically accompanied by a 
negative net contribution of enterprises to the government budget, as predicted by our 
model.  This seems to be the case of the Russian Republic in 1992, for example. Another 
example is Belarus, where the (negative) net flow from enterprises to the budget in 1992 
has widened in 1993, along with the delays in the structural reforms. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
  The main message of this paper, namely that the fiscal crisis in central Europe was 
mainly attributable - in the early 1990s - to increasing social expenditures, rather than to the 
collapse in enterprise profitability, is not intended to minimize the importance of the 
continued reform of the tax system and of tax administration.  In fact, the data on private 
sector participation in taxation in Poland that we provide in Barbone and Marchetti (1994) 
suggest that that sector is likely to be a less willing complier with the requirements of the 
fiscal system.  To the extent that privatization advances, maintaining an adequate buoyancy 
for the tax system might become more problematic, unless tax reform continues with vigor. 
 The paper, however, also sends a cautionary warning regarding the possibility of 
financing further increases in expenditures.  On a net basis, the decrease in revenues that 
has accompanied the economic transformation is limited.  All three countries examined in 
this paper appear to already have levels of taxation that are higher than comparators at 
similar per-capita income levels, and approximate or surpass those of western Europe.   
While no iron law exists here, society at large may not be willing to provide the resources 
that would be required to support the current level of expenditures or to extend it even 
further. Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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APPENDIX 
First note that, given the production functions (1) and (2), in order for any pair of 
production levels (x*,y*) to be feasible, they need to satisfy 
axy x* < y*          ( A 1 )  
and 
x*+ y*<L
α β           ( A 2 )  
where L is total labor available in the economy. The two terms in the left-hand-side 
of the disequality contained in (A2) refer to, respectively, the cost-minimizing amount of 
labor used to produce x* and y*. 
After the some algebra, it is possible to derive the schedule of πx and πy  as function 
of p (given x, y and w), as follows: 
x xy =x-w x-pa x π
α          (A3) 
and  
y =p y-w y. π
β           ( A 4 )  
It is also straightforward to derive the value of p1 and p2 - i.e., the values of p for 















α           ( A 6 )  
Note that the only interesting case arises when p1>p2 - that is, there is a price range 
for which both industries are profitable. In such case, it might exist some price vector 
which could support the given levels of x* and y* as a competitive equilibrium. In all 
other cases,  x* and y* could not be part of a competitive equilibrium by any means. 










β          ( A 7 )  
We now turn to the schedules of total profit tax revenues T and subsidy expenditure 
S as function of p (again, for given x, y and w). The algebraical expressions can be easily 
computed from equations (5) and (6), after due substitutions, and need not to be repeated 
here. It suffices to mention that the slope of both schedules varies over the domain, as 
shown in Figure 1. It can be checked that, in order for the tax revenues schedule to cross Transition and the Fiscal Crisis... 
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over the subsidy outlays schedule, at some price greater than p2 and lower than p1, τ 
needs to satisfy: 
τ < a x
y
.
xy          ( A 8 )  
  This is the last condition imposed on the parameters of the model. It assures that, 
when relative prices are very far from the market-oriented ones, subsidy outlays more 
than offset profit tax revenues, and the fiscal surplus turns into a deficit. In other words, it 
prevents the central planner in a socialist economy from enjoying an infinite fiscal 
surplus out of highly distorted relative prices - quite an unlikely occurrence, for the 
reasons mentioned above in the paper. 
  The following are the values of p0 and p3 - i.e., the values of p for which, holding 




















        ( A 1 0 )  L. Barbone & D.J. Marchetti 
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